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Criminal Law Practitioner
AMENDING THE UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE
OF CONVICTION ACT
by Stephen A. Saltz burg
Introduction
The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (also known
as The Uniform Law Commission) approved
and amended the Uniform Collateral Con-
sequences of Conviction Act in 2 0 0 .1 The
Commission recognized that burdens im-
posed on individuals convicted for viola-
tion of federal and state criminal laws often
made it difficult for those individuals to suc-
cessfully re-enter society after serving their
criminal sentences. The Commission wrote:
The growth of the
convicted population means
that there are literally mil-
lions of people being released
from incarceration, probation
and parole supervision every
year. They must successfully
reintegrate into society or be
at risk for recidivism. Society
has a strong interest in pre-
venting recidivism. An indi-
vidual who could have suc-
cessfully reentered society
but for avoidable cause reof-
fends generates the financial
and human costs of the new
crime, expenditure of law en-
1 Uniform Collateral Consequences of Convictions
Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (amended 2010) [the Act] available at http://www.uni-
formlaws.org/shared/docs/collateralconsequences/ucca_fi-
nal_10.pdf
forcement, judicial and cor-
rections resources, and the
loss of the productive work
that the individual could
have contributed to the econ-
omy. Society also has a strong
interest in seeing that indi-
viduals convicted of crimes
can regain the legal status of
ordinary citizens to prevent
the creation of a permanent
class of "internal exiles" who
cannot establish themselves
as law-abiding and produc-
tive members of the commu-
nity.
[It] has become increasingly
difficult to avoid or mitigate
the impact of collateral con-
sequences. Most states have
not yet developed a compre-
hensive and effective way of
"neutralizing" the effect of a
conviction in cases where it
is not necessary or appropri-
ate for it to be decisive. In
almost every U.S. jurisdic-
tion, offenders seeking to put
their criminal past behind
them are frustrated by a legal
system that is complex and
unclear and entirely inad-
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equate to the task. As a prac-
tical matter, in most jurisdic-
tions people convicted of a
crime have no hope of ever
being able to fully discharge
their debt to society ... .
The Commission accurately identified
the problems that collateral consequences
pose for any person seeking to resume a nor-
mal life after being convicted of a crime and
after serving the criminal penalty a jurisdic-
tion exacts as a consequence of the conviction.
The reality for many is that they continue to
pay for their crimes without the normal play-
ers in the criminal justice system being aware
of the impact of collateral consequences. The
prosecutor and criminal defense counsel finish
their work once a conviction becomes final and
a defendant is placed under the control of ei-
ther a court in the form of judicially supervised
probation or a correctional system in either jail
or prison. The court generally finishes its work
when a defendant completes probation, and
the correctional system finishes its work when
a convicted defendant is finally released from
incarceration and completes any post-incar-
ceration period of parole or supervised release.
Having accurately identified the prob-
lems confronting a convicted person seeking to
re-enter a community, the Commission makes
the following assertion: "[t]he criminal justice
system must pay attention to collateral conse-
quences. If the sentence is a reliable indicator,
collateral consequences in many instances are
what is really at stake, the real point of achieving
a conviction."' The Commission's reasoning for
this assertion is based on the fact that in 2004,
6o% of individuals convicted of felonies in
state courts were not sentenced to prison. In-
stead, 3o% of those individuals were sentenced
to probation or other non-incarceration alter-
2 Id. at 1-4. The Prefatory Note is not part of the
legislation that the Commission recommends to the states, but
it does purport to set forth the justifications for that legisla-
tion. It remains on the Commission's website and presumably
represents the Commission's official position on the rationales
for the Act.
3 Id. at 4.
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natives, and the other 3 o% received jail rather
than prison terms. This, according to the Com-
mission, means that "[in a high percentage of
cases, the real work of the legal system is done
not by fine or imprisonment, but by chang-
ing the legal status of convicted individuals."
Many collateral consequences of convic-
tion are unnecessary and could actually have
the perverse effect of encouraging convicted
individuals to pursue additional criminal acts
once they discover that many lawful means of
supporting themselves and their families are
unavailable to them. But the Commission's as-
sertion as to "the real point of achieving a con-
viction" can be read two ways, and neither in-
terpretation finds support in the data relied on
by the Commission. One way to read the asser-
tion is that the Commission contends that the
criminal justice system is not set up to protect
public safety, deter crime, encourage rehabili -
tation and discourage recidivism, and is actu-
ally intended to create a second class category
of people, by convicting them of criminal acts
and relegating them forever to second class sta-
tus. Such a stretch would cast doubt on the
motives of not only legislators throughout the
country, but also on lawyers and judges who
participate in the criminal justice system in the
belief that it serves legitimate penal purposes.
The other reading of "the real point
of achieving a conviction" is the notion that
probation, and perhaps jail sentences rather
than prison sentences, are not really punish-
ments imposed on individuals. However, this
notion reflects a misunderstanding of pun-
ishment. After all, when a court puts an in-
dividual on probation, there typically are con-
ditions that restrict the individual's former
freedom. Probation is not a pass. It is a se-
rious status that requires behavioral modifica-
tion and threatens revocation and incarcera-
tion as the consequences of violating probation
conditions. Similarly, when an individual is
sentenced to jail rather than prison, the in-
dividual is incarcerated, not sent off to sum-
mer camp. The fact is that states may be wise
4 Id.
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THE COMMSSON ACCURATELY DENTFED THE PROBLEMS THAT
COLLATERAL CONSEUENCES POSE FOR ANY PERSON SENG TO
RESUME A NORMAL LIFE AFTER BEING CONVICTE OF A CRIME AND
WHATEVER CRIMINAL PENALTY A JURISDICTIN EXACTS AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF CONVICTION.
when they determine that punishment short
of prison may accomplish the goals of crimi-
nal justice and that such punishment is often
commensurate with the relatively minor con-
duct that our society so often has criminalized.
Perhaps the greatest problem with the
Commission's analysis is the assumption that
the intent of lawmakers is to impose collat-
eral consequences as a punishment. The re-
ality in many cases is that well-intentioned
lawmakers use collateral consequences as
a means of protecting society without be-
ing fully aware of how many collateral conse-
quences they have imposed and how sweep-
ing the effects can be for those whom the
collateral consequences are imposed upon.
Despite the hyperbole in its identifica-
tion of "the real point of achieving a convic-
tion," the Act represents an effort to get states
to look at their collateral consequences and
determine whether they can be eliminated or
reduced, and whether they can be tailored to
appropriately balance public safety with a for-
mer offender's need for employment, hous-
ing, and other benefits. The need for states
and the federal government to take a hard
look at collateral sanctions is demonstrated
by the American Bar Association's creation
of the National Inventory of the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction (NICCC).' The
NICCC demonstrates that there are tens of
thousands of collateral consequences through-
5 ABA National Inventory of the Collateral Conse-
quences of Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.
org(last visited May 17, 2015).
out the United States and affords legislators a
ready vehicle for re-examination and reform.'
The Act provides a starting place for
interested legislators, but it has become clear
that the Act needs further work if it is to ad-
equately deal with the problems associated
with collateral consequences. Below, I sug-
gest some of the changes that should be made.
Defining Collateral Consequence
The Commission states in its Prefatory
Note to the Act that "[t]he term 'collateral sanc-
tion' is used here to mean a legal disability that
occurs by operation of law because of a con-
viction but is not part of the sentence for the
crime. It is 'collateral' because it is not part of
the direct sentence."7 That is the same basic
definition used in the NICCC. Yet, Section 2(2)
of the Act defines "collateral sanction" to mean
6 If a user of the website clicks on a state, at the bot-
tom of each page, the user will learn that there are 46,523 total
entries, all but several thousand of which are collateral conse-
quences. Attorney General Eric Holder has written to the At-
torneys General of every state to encourage them to examine
the collateral consequences in their states with an eye to reduc-
ing or eliminating those that are unnecessary to protect public
safety. One of the reasons that the Department of Justice has
supported the NICCC is its judgment that many legislators and
law enforcement officials have too little knowledge as to the
overall impact of collateral consequences in their jurisdictions.
7 The Act, supra note 1, at 2.
8 ABA N.I.C.C.C, supra note 6, http://www.abacol-
lateralconsequences.org/description. ("Persons convicted of
crime are subject to a wide variety of legal and regulatory
sanctions and restrictions in addition to the sentence imposed
by the court. These so- called 'collateral consequences' of
conviction .. ).
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"a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however
denominated, imposed on an individual as a re-
sult of the individual's conviction of an offense
which applies by operation of law whether or not
the penalty disability or disadvantage is included
in the judgment or sentence." (Emphasis added).9
The Act's definition of "collateral sanc-
tion" in Section 2 confuses both collateral
sanctions and sentencing sanctions, making it
impossible to know where the difference lies.
This definition contradicts the definition of
"collateral sanction" in the Prefatory Note and
needs clarification. Surely, nothing is more im-
portant in a model act than knowing precisely
what it covers. The confusion in the basic defi-
nition of a collateral sanction is exacerbated by
the Comment which states that the definition
in paragraph 2 is taken from Section 19-1.1 of
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Col-
lateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualifi-
cation of Convicted Persons.o It turns out that
the statement is not exactly correct. Section 19-
i.i(a) of the ABA Standards provides: "the term
"collateral sanction" means a legal penalty, dis-
ability or disadvantage, however denominated,
that is imposed on a person automatically upon
that person's conviction for a felony, misde-
meanor or other offense, even if it is not in-
cluded in the sentence." The ABA Standard is
itself confusing because it fails to explain how
a sanction can be collateral if it is part of the
sentence. The ABA Standard may implicitly
say what the Act says explicitly. But, the Act
purports to deal with collateral consequences,
which it defines in Section i, (i) as "a collat-
eral sanction or a disqualification." The ABA
Standards do not use the term "collateral
consequence" in the text of the Standards
and only use it in the Commentary." The
bottom line is that the Act needs to clarify
9 The Act § 2(2).
10 Id. § 2(2) cmt. at 8.
11 American Bar Association, ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Dis-
qualification of Convicted Persons, Standard 19-1.1(a) (3d ed.
2004).
12 The Act § 2(1).
13 ABA Standards for Collateral Sanctions,
supra note 12, at 7-13.
what it means by col-
lateral consequences






Section 4 of the Act states that a desig-
nated government agency or official shall iden-
tify all legal provisions that impose collateral
consequences or that authorize the imposition
of a disqualification resulting from or relating
to conviction for an offense." It would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for any official or agen-
cy to complete the task without knowing what
constitutes a collateral sanction and whether
sanctions imposed by courts as part of crimi-
nal judgments are direct or collateral sanctions.
Section 4(a)(4) of the Act states that in
performing the collection task the agency of
official "may rely on the study of this state's
collateral sanctions, disqualifications, and re-
lief provisions prepared by the National In-
stitute of Justice described in Section 51o of
the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007,
Pub. L. no- 177." The NICCC is that study.
Now that the NICCC has defined col-
lateral consequence (including collateral sanc-
tion) as limited to matters not imposed in a
judgment of conviction, the Act should be
amended so that its definitions are consis-
tent with the NICCC. Alternatively, the Act
should be amended to specify which conse-
quences not included in the NICCC definition,
should be collected by the agency or official.
Improving Notice
Section 3 provides that if a state adopts
the Act as written, in the event of noncompli-
ance with the Act's requirements, the noncom-
pliance does not provide a basis for invalidat-
ing a plea, conviction, or sentence." This makes
14 The Act § 4(a)(1).
15 Id. § 3(a)(1).
34 Washington College of Law Summer 2015
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little sense if, in fact, the effect of collateral
consequences may be more devastating than
the penalties imposed by a court. Why should
there be no consequences for failing to assure
that the notice of collateral consequences re-
quired by Section 5 is provided to each defen-
dant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere?'6
There is no answer from the Commission, and
its failure to include a remedy for what it re-
gards as a fundamentally important notice is
inconsistent with its recognition of the impor-
tant ramifications of collateral consequences.
Pleas already states that defense counsel should
advise defendants of the collateral consequenc-
es of conviction." There is little reason why the
Act should not impose a similar requirement.
In Padilla .Kentucky, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that it was ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel for a defense coun-
sel to fail to warn the defendant that a convic-
tion would lead to deportation where that was
an obvious consequence of conviction.'9 The
end result was to impose a burden on defense
IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ANY OFFICIAL OR
AGENCY TO COMPLETE THE TASK WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL SANCTION AND WHETHER SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY COURTS AS PART OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS ARE DIRECT
OR COLLATERAL SANCTIONS.
The Act does not provide which govern-
ment agency or official will give the notice re-
quired by Section 5, and it is unclear which is
most likely to give effective notice. The ques-
tion arises as to why defense counsel should
not be required to give the notice and to as-
sure a court at the time of plea that it has been
given, and in the case of pro se litigants why the
court should not be required to give the notice.
This would ensure that there is a record that
notice has been given. If notice is not given,
there should be an opportunity for a defendant
to move to withdraw a plea in circumstances
where the collateral consequences may be more
severe than the penalty imposed by the court at
sentencing.7 ABA Standard 14-3.2(f) for Guilty
16 See id. § 5(a)-(b) (stating requirements of the des-
ignated government agency or official and the court to give
notice of collateral consequences in pretrial proceedings and at
the guilty plea, respectively).
17 See id. § 5 cmt. at 17 (stating "[c]ompliance with
this provision should be sufficiently simple, that questions
of the consequences of non-compliance should rarely arise.
However, the criminal justice system depends on the finality
counsel and to provide a remedy for a defen-
dant who was not properly advised by defense
counsel. The Act indicates that the drafters
were aware of the Padilla decision,0 and yet the
drafters imposed no burden on defense coun-
sel to give warnings to defendants and provid-
ed no remedy for the failure to give warnings1
ofjudgments. Accordingly, there is strong reason not to upset
a plea for a technical deficiency in guilty plea procedure, and
this is the prevailing rule").
Referring to failure to advise about collateral con-
sequences as a "technical deficiency" seems completely out
of place in a document that maintains that "it has become
increasingly difficult to avoid or mitigate the impact of col-
lateral consequences," and that "[a]s a practical matter, in most
jurisdictions people convicted of a crime have no hope of ever
being able to fully discharge their debt to society." Id. at 4.
18 American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Crim-
inal Justice: Guilty Pleas, Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999).
19 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
20 The Act § 5 cmt. at 14.
21 It is true, as Justice Alito's concurrence points out
in Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375-388, that it will not always be
clear what exactly a defense counsel should be required to tell
a defendant. But, as the Act suggests, there are some basic
warnings that can and should be provided in every case. The
Summer 2015 Washington College of Law 35
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Another defect in the Act is that Section
5(b) only requires the court to assure that the
defendant has received notice about collater-
al consequences when the defendant seeks to
plead guilty or nolo contendere. In fact, defen-
dants who plead not guilty and seek to go to trial
may have every bit as much a need to know about
collateral consequences as those who plead
guilty because they may not understand that a
plea to a different charge might avoid certain
consequences that would result from a convic-
tion at trial. If defense counsel were required to
give the notice to defendants before they pled,
the court would be able to assure itself that the
defendant's choice to plead not guilty is not a
result of ignorance of collateral consequences.
Similarly, a pro se defendant could be warned
by the court about collateral consequences
before entering a plea and could be given a
chance to reconsider whether to request coun-
sel in order to better understand the relative
effects of entering a plea versus going to trial.
In addition to shifting the burden of
providing notice from some unidentified agen-
cy or official to defense counsel (or the court
in the case of pro se litigants), the Act should
be amended to improve the notice that is
provided at the time a plea is entered. Sec-
tion 6 of the Act provides that at sentencing
or upon release from incarceration an indi-
vidual should be provided the following notice:
(1) that collateral con-
sequences may ap-
ply because of the
conviction;
(2) of the Internet ad-




same can be said of what a court should tell a pro se litigant.
22 The Act § 4(c) provides that the designated govern-
ment agency of official shall publish or cause to be published
the title and Internet address of the most recent publication of
the collateral consequences imposed by federal law and any
provision of federal law that may afford relief from a collateral
consequence.
36 Washington College of Law Summer 2015
(3) that there may be
ways to obtain relief
from collateral con-
sequences;
(4) of contact informa-
tion for government
or nonprofit agen-




ing relief from col-
lateral consequenc-
es; and
(5) of when an indi-
vidual convicted of
an offense may vote
under this state's
law. 23
Section 5 already requires notice of (i) and
(2) at the time of a guilty plea?. Why not re-
quire the other information in (3), (4), and (5)
to be provided at the same time, and as sug-
gested above, at the time of a not guilty plea
as well? The decision whether to plead and
incur one or more collateral consequences
might be affected by the potential opportuni-
ties later to obtain relief from a consequence.
There may be various entities better able than
a defense lawyer or a judge to assess the fu-
ture probability of obtaining relief and that
may be willing, at least in some instances, to
offer an opinion on the prospects for future
relief before a defendant actually enters a plea.
The Act offers no justification for hold-
ing back this information until someone has
already been convicted or has already pled
guilty and is about to be sentenced. If the
information were provided prior to entry of
a plea, there is reason to question whether
there.~ would be a nee to re1eat it "s n Djai
23 The Act § 6(a).
24 Section 5 is entitled "Notice of Collateral Conse-
quences in Pretrial Proceeding and at Guilty Plea."
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of sentencing" as Section 6(b) now requires.
Section 6(c) requires that an unidentified
agency or official must also give the same no-
tice required by Section 6(a) "not more than
[3o], and, if practicable, at least !io], days before
-~ -~.~M-
release."25 This makes little sense for an indi-
vidual who is sentenced to ten, thirty or sixty
days in jail and has been given all the same
information at sentencing (or as I would re-
quire prior to pleading). It does make sense
to provide notice to someone who has served
a prison sentence of years because circum-
stances may have changed. The Act treats all
defendants alike regardless of how long they
serve any form of incarceration without ex-
plaining why repetitive notice is necessary.
If one assumes that repetitive notice is
a good thing, then the actual notice required
by the Act is defective and, surprisingly, delib-
erately so. The Comment to Section 6 states:
"[t]he notice contemplated by this section is
modest. It could be printed on a form issued
in the ordinary course of sentencing or pro-
cessing an individual for release.""' The no-
tice required by Section 5 of the Act for those
pleading guilty or nolo contendere requires
that the individual be warned of the possibility
of "deportation, removal, exclusion from ad-
mission to the United States, or denial of citi-
zenship," and these additional consequences:
* being unable to
get or keep some li-
censes, permits, or
jobs;
* being unable to
25 The Act § 6(c).
26 The Act § 6 cmt. at 19.
get or keep benefits
such as public hous-
ing or education;
* receiving a harsh-
er sentence if you
are convicted of an-
other offense in the
future;
* having the gov-
ernment take your
property; and
* being unable to
vote or possess a
firearm97
Why would anyone who believes
that repetitive notice is necessary fail to
repeat the information that Section 5 in-
dicates is important? The Act provides no
answer, and certainly the reason cannot be
financial. The Comment anticipates a form
that would be distributed to convicted and
incarcerated defendants. Such form cer-
tainly could include all the information re-
quired by Section 5 without increasing the
cost of the form to any appreciable extent.
Procedural Due Process
One of the most disappointing as-
pects of the Act is Section 8, entitled "De-
cision to Disqualify." This section governs
all disqualifications which Section 2(5) de-
fines as "a penalty, disability, or disadvan-
tage, however denominated, that an admin-
istrative agency, governmental official, or
court in a civil proceeding is authorized,
but not required, to impose on an individ-
ual on grounds relating to the individual's
conviction of an offense." The Act defines
"collateral sanctions" as the consequences
that are imposed by operation of law with-
out the exercise of discretion by an agency
or official and distinguishes them from the
discretionary decisions covered by Sec-
27 Id. § 5(a).
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tion 8.28 The distinction is an important
part of the Act as evinced by Section 7(b),
which provides that "[a] law creating a col-
lateral consequence that is ambiguous as
to whether it imposes a collateral sanc-
tion or authorizes a disqualification must
be construed as authorizing a disqualifi-






effect on third par-
ties of granting the
benefit or oppor-
ONE OF THE MOST ISAPPOINTING ASPECTS OF THE ACT S
SECTION 8. ENTITLED "IECISION TO DISOUALFY."
tween automatic and discretionary conse-
quences, Section 8 provides no opportunity
for the convicted person to be heard before










nity at issue should










involved in the of-
fense, and the es-
sential elements of





ements of the of-




such as an order of
limited relief or a
certificate of resto-
ration of rights.9
Given the importance of collateral
consequences and the enormous impact they
can have on an individual, the denial of any
opportunity for the individual to be heard
before a decision is made is striking. The Act
strangely provides that the decision-maker
should consider "the effect on third parties
of granting the benefit or opportunity""o and
completely omits any requirement that the
decision-maker consider the effect on the in-
dividual who may be disqualified. At a mini-
mum, the official or agency should be required
to give the individual some opportunity, pref-
erably before a decision is made, to address
the decision-maker and to provide anything
the individual believes should be considered
relevant to the discretionary decision.' The
individual should have the opportunity to ad-
29 Id. § 8.
30 The Act § 8.
31 The Supreme Court has made clear that before dis-
qualifying a lawyer in a case for an alleged conflict of interest,
a judge has a duty to inquire about the conflict. Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The inquiry is intended to
protect the defendant, not the lawyer; the effect of a disqualifi-
cation is to deny the defendant the benefit of the lawyer he or
she desires. The duty of inquiry is incorporated into Fed. R.
Crim. P. 44.
38 Washington College of Law Summer 2015
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dress the impact that disqualification might
have on everyone who could be affected by
the decision whether or not to disqualify.2
The failure of the Act to provide any
opportunity for a convicted person to par-
ticipate in the process leading to a discre-
tionary decision is a major defect. Even if
there are circumstances in which a decision
must be made so quickly that a right to be
heard would not be practicable, the right to
appeal a decision could be a substitute and
still provide some opportunity for the person
affected by a disqualification to participate.
The Burden of Persuasion on Relief
Section io(a) of the Act provides that
an individual convicted of an offense may
petition for an order of limited relief from a
collateral sanction (i.e., a consequence auto-
matically imposed by operation of law) to the
sentencing court at or before sentencing or
to a designated board or agency at any time
after sentencing. Section to (b) imposes the
burden on the petitioning individual to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) granting the peti-
tion will materi-








(2) the individual has
substantial need for
the relief requested
in order to live a
law-abiding life;
and
(3) granting the peti-
tion would not pose
32 The Comment to Section 8, like the Act itself, makes
no mention of a right to heard. Id. § 6 cmt. at 21-23.
an unreasonable
risk to the safety
or welfare of the
public or any indi-
vidual.3
It makes some sense to impose the bur-
den of proving (i) and (2) on the petition-
ing individual, and that burden should
be easy to meet in most cases since the
individual would not likely file a peti-
tion unless he or she believed that one
or more collateral consequences was
causing substantial problems related
to the items specified in (i). If the in-
dividual makes the showing as to (i), it
will be automatic or virtually so that the
individual also satisfies (2). But, there
is a strong argument that the burden
on (3) should be shifted to the govern-
ment. This is not simply because prov-
ing a negative is often difficult, but it
is also because the government should
be required to identify the safety issue
about which it is concerned so that the
decision-maker can consider whether
there is a remedy short of leaving the col-
lateral sanction in full effect that would
be adequate to protect public safety.4
A similar argument for shifting
the burden can be made with respect
to Section n of the Act, entitled "Cer-
tificate of Restoration of Rights." That
Section provides that an individual may
seek a certificate of restoration of rights
after a certain period of years following
conviction or release from confinement.
It requires the individual to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
33 Id. § 10(b).
34 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §3142 (2008) (implicitly
imposing upon the government the burden in many instances
of showing that a defendant would pose a threat if released
pending trial). See also United States v Vortis, 785 F.2d 327,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 841 (1986) (magistrate correctly found
risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence). Of course,
the statute deals with pretrial release while collateral conse-
quences affect those already convicted, but both address com-
munity safety.
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(1) the individual is
engaged in, or seek-





tative programs, or the
individual otherwise
has a lawful source of
support;
(2) the individual is not
in violation of the
terms of any criminal
sentence, or that any




(3) a criminal charge is
not pending against
the individual; and
(4) granting the petition
would not pose an
unreasonable risk to
the safety or welfare
of the public or any
individual."
It seems fair to require the defendant to
prove (1), (2), and (3), but it would make
more sense to require the government
to prove (4). Neither the Comment to
Section 1o 6 nor the Comment to Sec-
tion n " contains even a discussion of
the proper allocation of the burden of
persuasion. This is a glaring omission.
Another defect in the Act is that it
contains no specification as to who bears
the burden of persuasion with respect to
intermediate relief, which relieves some
but not all of the effects of a collateral
sanction or disqualification. Section n(c)
35 The Act § 11(b).
36 Id. § 10 cmt. at 28-30.
37 Id. § 11 cmt. at 31-32.
40 Wasbington College of Law Summer 2015
states that "[a] certificate of restoration
of rights must specify any restriction im-
posed and collateral sanction for which
relief has not been granted under Sec-
tion i3(a)." Section i3(a) refers to petitions
filed pursuant to both Sections to and i
and contains a sentence stating that "[t]he
court may issue an order and the [desig-
nated board or agency] may issue an order
or certificate subject to restriction, con-
dition, or additional requirement." This
appears to permit some intermediate ap-
proach, as the Comment to the Section
makes clear in the following language:
Section 3(a)
allows the grant of
conditional relief
For example, a Cer-
tificate of Restora-
tion of Rights could
withhold the right
to seek public hous-
ing in the building
where the victim
lives, or could con-
dition relief on par-
ticipation in a reha-
bilitative program. If




required to wait for
a period of time to
reapply, or to reap-
ply only after Udit-
specified rehabilita-
tion or training.38
Whose burden is it to suggest restric-
tions or conditions? And what is the
standard of proof? It seems that any
restrictions or conditions would be re-
lated to public safety and welfare con-
cerns, which the government is better
positioned than an individual to address.
38 Id. § 13 cmt. at 35.
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Sanctions that Cannot Be Relieved
Section 12 of the Act states that
an order of limited relief (i.e., turning
a sanction into a disqualification) or a
certificate of restoration of rights may
not be issued to relieve collateral sanc-
tions related to sex offender registra-
tion requirements, certain motor vehicle
sanctions, or ineligibility for employ-
ment in various law enforcement and
prosecutor offices. The motor vehicle
provision appears harmless as it is de-
signed, as the Comment to Section 12
states, to avoid creating remedies that
are duplicative or inconsistent with al-
ready available remedies. 9 But, there is
nothing in the Comment that explains
why sex offender statutes and employ-
ment opportunities require insulation
from relief provisions. This is especial-
ly troublesome in view of the fact that
some states have such broad definitions
of sex offenses that they cover conduct
that other states would regard as harm-
less and would seem prime candidates
for relief from collateral consequences.o
As for employment opportunities,
the Comment to Section 12 is inconsis-
tent with the Act. The Comment states
"[n]othing in this Section prohibits states
from permitting law enforcement agen-
cies to consider hiring individuals with
criminal records."4' But, theActmakes the
collateral sanctions (i.e., automatic pro-
visions by operation of law) that restrict
employment ineligible for relief, so there
is no way an agency can hire someone
who is legally barred from employment.
39 Id. § 12 cmt. at 32-33.
40 Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex
Offender Residence and Employment Restrictions, 40 Akron
L. Rev. 339, 342 (2007) ("The definition of what is a sex of-
fense is set forth by statute and varies from state to state. In
some states the list is short, while in others the list is exten-
sive.").
41 The Act § 12 cmt. at 33.
Conclusion
The Act is well intentioned and the
Commission deserves credit for recogniz-
ing both the important impact that collateral
consequences can have on the lives of indi-
viduals convicted of criminal acts and for em-
phasizing how great a contribution that the
NICCC has made and will continue to make
as legislators are called upon to revisit collat-
eral consequences. According to the Com-
mission's website, only Vermont has enacted
the Uniform Act. It is difficult to determine
whether other states have failed to move for-
ward because they have not yet recognized
the significance of collateral consequences
or they have found the Act to be problematic
in at least some of the ways suggested here.
The Commission can always act to
improve the Act. The first step is recogniz-
ing the problems with it. Those problems
include inconsistency, incompleteness, and
questionable policy choices. Reasonable
minds can debate the policy choices, but in-
consistency and incompleteness are deficien-
cies that should not exist in a Uniform Act.
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